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EMOTIONAL DISTRESS IN PRODUCTS LIABILITY:
DISTINGUISHING USERS FROM BYSTANDERS
INTRODUCTION
The law governing recovery for emotional distress' in products
liability2 is at a critical stage of development. In cases involving only
1. "Emotional distress" is used interchangeably with other terms such as "emo-
tional trauma," "mental anguish" or "mental suffering" to connote injury to the
psyche. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 comment j (1965). In negligence,
courts were traditionally unwilling to impose a duty to refrain from inflicting emo-
tional distress. Rodrigues v. State, 52 Hawaii 156, 169-70, 472 P.2d 509, 518 (1970):
Daley v. LaCroix, 384 Mich. 4, 8, 179 N.W.2d 390, 392 (1970); Johnson v. State, 37
N.Y.2d 378, 381, 334 N.E.2d 590, 591-92, 372 N.Y.S.2d 638, 641 (1975). The
primary rationales for denying recovery were concerns about the possibility of spu-
rious claims, Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 110, 45 N.E. 354, 355 (1896),
overruled, Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 239, 176 N.E.2d 729, 730, 219 N.Y.S.2d
34, 35-36 (1961), a vast increase in the amount of litigation, Knaub v. Cotwalt, 422
Pa. 267, 272, 220 A.2d 646, 647 (1966), overruled, Niederman v. Brodsky, 436 Pa.
401, 413, 261 A.2d 84, 89-90 (1970), and unduly burdensome liability for defend-
ants. Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 617-18, 249 N.E.2d 419, 423, 301 N.Y.S.2d
554, 559-60 (1969). When a plaintiff alleged invasion of an independent legal right,
however, courts were more likely to permit recovery for emotional distress. W.
Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts 52 (4th ed. 1971). The "impact rule" permit-
ted recovery for emotional distress when defendant's conduct resulted in physical
contact with the plaintiff. See, e.g., Christy Bros. Circus v. Turnage, 38 Ga. App.
581, 581, 144 S.E. 680, 681 (1928); Boston v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 223 Ind. 425,
430, 61 N.E.2d 326, 327-28 (1945). When courts recognized the need to redress
genuine emotional injury, they construed the term "impact" broadly. Morton v.
Stack, 122 Ohio St. 115, 116, 170 N.E. 869, 869 (1930) (inhalation of smoke suffi-
cient impact); Zelinsky v. Chimics, 196 Pa. Super. 312, 318, 175 A.2d 351, 354
(1961) (jostling of passengers in automobile after collision sufficient impact). Because
the impact rule proved unsatisfactory, in that it" 'bre[d] dishonest attempts to mold
the facts so as to fit them within the grooves leading to recovery,' " Battalla v. State,
10 N.Y.2d 237, 241, 176 N.E.2d 729, 731, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34, 37 (1961); accord Daley
v. LaCroix, 384 Mich. 4, 11-12, 179 N.W.2d 390, 394 (1970), it was abandoned in
most jurisdictions. W. Prosser, supra, at 332. Instead, courts focused on the presence
of physical consequences, see Bowman v. Williams, 164 Md. 397, 400-02, 165 A. 182,
183-84 (1933), or the particular circumstances of the case. Johnson v. State, 37
N.Y.2d 378, 383-84, 334 N.E.2d 590, 593, 372 N.Y.S.2d 638, 643 (1975); Lambert,
Tort Liability for Psychic Injuries, 41 B.U. L. Rev. 584, 589-93 (1961); McNiece,
Psychic Injury and Tort Liability in New York, 24 St. John's L. Rev. 1, 14-16 (1949).
In bystander cases, in which the plaintiff suffers emotional distress as a result of
witnessing physical injury to another, some jurisdictions have allowed recovery
under the zone of danger rule. See infra note 17.
2. A products liability suit may be predicated on negligence, breach of war-
ranty, or strict liability. E.g., Chestnut v. Ford Motor Co., 445 F.2d 967, 968 (4th
Cir. 1971); McAndrews v. Goody Co., 460 F. Supp. 104, 106 (D. Neb. 1978). Under
negligence theory, a seller or manufacturer is liable for harm to the plaintiff if the
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two parties-the plaintiff injured 3 by a defective product4 and the
product "may reasonably be expected to be capable of inflicting substantial harm If it
is defective." W. Prosser, supra note 1, at 643 (footnote omitted); accord Rhoads v.
Service Mach. Co., 329 F. Supp. 367, 373 (E.D. Ark. 1971); Restatement (Second) of
Torts §§ 291, 395 (1965). Warranty encompasses two distinct categories, express and
implied. Under an express warranty, recovery is allowed on the theory that the
consumer is entitled to rely on express affirmations of fact or descriptions of a
product. See, e.g., Lane v. C.A. Swanson & Sons, 130 Cal. App. 2d 210, 214, 278
P.2d 723, 725 (1955); Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 11 N.Y.2d
5, 12-13, 181 N.E.2d 399, 402-03, 226 N.Y.S.2d 363, 367-68 (1962); U.C.C. § 2-313
(1977). Implied warranties fall into two categories - the warranty of merchantabil-
ity, U.C.C. § 2-314 (1977), and the warranty of fitness for a particular purpose.
U.C.C. § 2-315 (1977). In order to recover for a breach of an implied warranty of
merchantability, the "plaintiff must prove (1) that a merchant sold goods, (2) which
were not 'merchantable' at the time of sale, and (3) injury and damages to the
plaintiff or his property (4) caused proximately and in fact by the defective nature of
the goods, and (5) notice to seller of injury." J. White & R. Summers, Handbook of
the Law Under the Uniform Commercial Code 343 (1980). "Merchantable" is de-
fined as "fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used." U.C.C. §
2-314(2)(c) (1977). In order to recover for a breach of a warranty of fitness for a
particular purpose, tvo requirements must be met: 1) the buyer must rely on the
seller's judgment in furnishing the product, and 2) the seller must have reason to
know of the particular purpose for which the goods are being selected. Catania v.
Brown, 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 344, 345-46, 231 A.2d 668, 670 (1967); Green Mountain
Mushroom Co. v. Brown, 117 Vt. 509, 512-13, 95 A.2d 679, 681-82 (1953). The
theory of strict liability in tort for defective products was first enunciated in Green-
man v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697
(1963), and adopted by the Second Restatement of Torts in 1965. Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 402A (1965). Section 402A provides: "(1) One who sells any
product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or
to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate
user or consumer, or to his property, if (a) the seller is engaged in the business of
selling such a product, and (b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer
without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold. (2) The rule stated in
Subsection (1) applies although (a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the
preparation and sale of his product, and (b) the user or consumer has not bought the
product from or entered into any contractual relation with the seller." Id. For a
discussion of the theories of recovery, see Green, Strict Liability Under Sections 402A
and 402B: A Decade of Litigation, 54 Tex. L. Rev. 1185, 1187-212 (1976); Noel,
Defective Products: Extension of Strict Liability to Bystanders, 38 Tenn. L. Rev. 1,
1-9 (1970); Phillips, A Synopsis of the Developing Law of Products Liability, 28
Drake L. Rev. 317, 325-42 (1978-1979); Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict
Liability to the Consumer), 50 Minn. L. Rev. 791, 800-23 (1966) [hereinafter cited as
Prosser I]; Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer),
69 Yale L.J. 1099, 1124-48 (1960).
3. In breach of warranty and strict liability actions, a plaintiff may recover
damages for personal injury and destruction of property. Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 402A (1965); J. White & R. Summers, supra note 2, at 396; Prosser I, supra
note 2, at 820-23; see Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 62, 377
P.2d 897, 900-01, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 700-01 (1963); Hamilton Fixture Co. v. Ander-
son, 285 So. 2d 744, 746-47 (Miss. 1973); Barnett v. Ford Motor Co., 463 S.W.2d 33,
35 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970). Punitive damages may also be awarded in an extreme case.
See, e.g., Gillham v. Admiral Corp., 523 F.2d 102, 108-09 (6th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1976); Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Day, 594 P.2d 38, 46-47 (Alaska
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defendant seller or manufacturer 5-courts have allowed recovery for
1979); Toole v. Richardson-Merrell Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 711, 714-15, 60 Cal.
Rptr. 398, 414, 416 (1967). For a discussion of the issues involved in awarding
punitive damages, see 3 L. Frumer & M. Friedman, Products Liability § 36A (1981);
Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 Mich. L. Rev. 1257
(1976). Pure economic loss is typically denied when the suit is predicated on strict
liability. See, e.g., Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 16-19, 403 P.2d 145,
150-52, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 22-24 (1965); Henderson v. General Motors Corp., 152 Ga.
App. 63, 64, 262 S.E.2d 238, 240 (1979); Alfred N. Koplin & Co. v. Chrysler Corp.,
49 Ill. App. 3d 194, 203, 364 N.E.2d 100, 107 (1977); Hawkins Constr. Co. v.
Matthews Co., 190 Neb. 546, 561-63, 209 N.V.2d 643, 653 (1973). But see Santor v.
A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 67, 207 A.2d 305, 313 (1965). See generally
Speidel, Products Liability, Economic Loss and the UCC, 40 Tenn. L. Rev. 309,
315-18 (1973) (discussion of recovery for lost profits in warranty and strict liability).
4. A product can be rendered defective due to a design defect, a manufacturing
defect, or the manufacturer's failure to warn of the product's dangerous propensities.
Lancaster Silo & Block Co. v. Northern Propane Gas Co., 75 A.D.2d 55, 61-62, 427
N.Y.S.2d 1009, 1013 (1980). In a design defect case, the manufacturer's chosen
design is challenged as unreasonably dangerous. Robinson v. Reed-Prentice Div. of
Package Mach. Co., 49 N.Y.2d 471, 479, 403 N.E.2d 440, 443, 426 N.Y.S.2d 717,
720 (1980); Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 487, 525 P.2d 1033, 1034
(1974). A manufacturing defect is a flaw or mistake in the product, whereby the
product deviates from others in the line, or from the manufacturer's desired result. 2
L. Frumer & M. Friedman, supra note 3, § 16A[4][f][iii] (1981); Traynor, The Ways
and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32 Tenn. L. Rev. 363,
365-73 (1965). A product, although faultlessly manufactured, can nevertheless be
defective if it is unaccompanied by warnings of the dangers attendant to its use.
Failure to warn actions are predicated on negligence, see Drayton v. Jiffee Chem.
Corp., 395 F. Supp. 1081, 1087-88 (N.D. Ohio 1975), modified on other grounds,
591 F.2d 352 (6th Cir. 1978), or strict liability. See Crane v. Sears Roebuck & Co.,
218 Cal. App. 2d 855, 859, 32 Cal. Rptr. 754, 756 (1963); Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 402A comment h (1965). Many courts impose a duty to warn only of
foreseeable dangers, thereby blurring the distinctions between the two bases for
liability. McClellan, Strict Liability for Drug Induced Injuries: An Excursion
Through the Maze of Products Liability, Negligence and Absolute Liability, 25
Wayne L. Rev. 1, 6-9 (1978); Note, The Liability of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers
for Unforeseen Adverse Drug Reactions, 48 Fordham L. Rev. 735, 74548 (1980); see,
e.g., Oakes v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 272 Cal. App. 2d 645, 650-51, 77
Cal. Rptr. 709, 713 (1969); Woodill v. Parke Davis & Co., 58 Ill. App. 3d 349, 352,
374 N.E.2d 683, 686 (1978). A minority of cases have distinguished the theories of
negligence and strict liability in the failure to warn context. E.g., Hamilton v.
Hardy, 37 Colo. App. 375, 383-84, 549 P.2d 1099, 1106-07 (1976); Little v. PPG
Indus., Inc., 19 Wash. App. 812, 822, 579 P.2d 940, 947 (1978), modified on other
grounds, 92 Wash. 2d 118, 594 P.2d 911 (1979).
5. Parties that have been held liable in strict liability include manufacturers,
e.g., Kohler v. Ford Motor Co., 187 Neb. 428, 436, 191 N.W.2d 601, 606 (1971);
Ulmer v. Ford Motor Co., 75 Wash. 2d 522, 531-32, 452 P.2d 729, 734-35 (1969),
wholesalers, e.g., Bailey v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 6 Ariz. App. 213, 219, 431
P.2d 108, 111 (1967), retailers, e.g., Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256,
262-63, 391 P.2d 168, 171-72, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896, 899-900 (1964); Kleve v. General
Motors Corp., 210 N.W.2d 568, 571 (Iowa 1973), lessors, e.g., Bachner v. Pearson,
479 P.2d 319, 327-28 (Alaska 1970); Gallucio v. Hertz Corp., 1 111. App. 3d 272,
278-79, 274 N.E.2d 178, 182-83 (1971), bailors, e.g., Cintrone v. Hertz Truck
Leasing & Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 450, 212 A.2d 769, 777-78 (1965), and a
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emotional harm." Recently, however, conflicting results have been
reached in suits involving three parties-that is, when a user 7 of a
product sues the manufacturer for emotional distress precipitated by
observing physical injury to another caused by that same product.
One jurisdiction, borrowing from predecent in non-product negli-
gence 8 and inaccurately characterizing the plaintiffs as bystanders,"
has allowed recovery in such a situation.10 Another jurisdiction,
lacking such precedent in negligence," denied recovery to this same
class of plaintiffs by applying the same improper bystander character-
ization.' 2
builder-vendor of homes. Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, 44 N.J. 70, 95-96, 207 A.2d 314,
326-28 (1965). Several states have sought to insulate retail dealers from suit when
jurisdiction can be obtained over the manufacturer. E.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-
402 (Supp. 1978); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 411.340 (Supp. 1980); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 99B-2
(1979). An action in strict liability may not be maintained against the casual,
one-time seller of an article, such as an individual who sells his used family automo-
bile. Lemley v. J & B Tire Co., 426 F. Supp. 1376, 1377 (W.D. Pa. 1977); Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts § 402A comment f (1965). In an action for breach of an
implied warranty of merchantability, the plaintiff may sue the "merchant." U.C.C.
§ 2-314 (1977). The Code defines a merchant as a "person who deals in goods of the
kind or otherwise by his occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or skill
peculiar to the practices or goods involved in the transaction." Id. § 2-104. In an
action for breach of an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, the
plaintiff may sue the seller. Id. § 2-315. A seller will normally also be a merchant,
although the warranty can apply to non-merchant sellers. Id. § 2-315 comment 4.
6. E.g., Way v. Tampa Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 So. 2d 288, 290 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1972); Wallace v. Coca-Cola Bottling Plants, 269 A.2d 117, 121-22 (Me.
1970).
7. The Second Restatement of Torts explains the terms "user or consumer" as
follows: " 'Consumers' include not only those who in fact consume the product, but
also those who prepare it for consumption; and the housewife who contracts tulare-
mia while cooking rabbits for her husband is included within the rule stated in this
Section, as is also the husband who is opening a bottle of beer for his wife to drink.
Consumption includes all ultimate uses for which the product is intended, and the
customer in a beauty shop to whose hair a permanent wave solution is applied by the
shop is a consumer. 'User' includes those who are passively enjoying the benefit of the
product, as in the case of passengers in automobiles or airplanes, as well as those who
are utilizing it for the purposes of doing work upon it, as in the case of an employee of
the ultimate buyer who is making repairs upon the automobile which he has pur-
chased." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A comment 1 (1965); see, e.g., Cottom
v. McGuire Funeral Seri., Inc., 262 A.2d 807, 809 (D.C. 1970) (person utilizing
product for the purpose for which it was made is a user of that product); Hamilton v.
Motor Coach Indus., Inc., 569 S.W.2d 571, 576 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978) (person
repairing a product is a user of that product).
8. Shepard v. Superior Court, 76 Cal. App. 3d 16, 19-21, 142 Cal. Rptr. 612,
614-15 (1977) (citing with approval Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69
Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968)).
9. Id. at 19-20, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 614-15.
10. Id. at 21, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 615.
11. See Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 249 N.E.2d 419, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554
(1969).
12. Vaccaro v. Squibb Corp., 52 N.Y.2d 809, 418 N.E.2d 386, 436 N.Y.S.2d 871
(1980).
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Such divergent results are grounded in the attachment of varying
weights to the competing policies of compensating a genuine injury 3
and limiting a manufacturer's liability.14 This Note contends that in
attempting to reach a compromise between these policies, a court's
primary inquiry should be whether a party claiming emotional dis-
tress is merely a bystander, or whether he is in fact a user of the
defective product. When appropriate, characterization of a party as a
user will allow him to reeover for emotional harm under well-estab-
lished products liability principles. Furthermore, if it is limited to the
user of the product, recovery for emotional harm will be confined to
an ascertainable group of plaintiffs. Such limitation will protect man-
ufacturers from unduly burdensome liability.
I. RECOVERY FOR EMOTIONAL DISTRESS IN THREE-PARTY CASES
A. Recovery for Emotional Distress in Non-product Negligence
The classic bystander situation was presented to the California
Supreme Court in Dillon v. Legg.'5 A mother watched as her daugh-
ter was struck and killed by a negligently driven automobile.", Al-
though the mother had not been in danger of physical injury,' 7 she
sued to recover for the severe emotional distress"8 suffered as a result
13. See sources cited infra note 54. The perceived difficulties in permitting
recovery for an emotional injury under the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A
(1965) led one jurisdiction to deny recovery for third-party emotional distress.
Woodill v. Parke & Davis Co., 58 Ill. App. 3d 349, 355, 374 N.E.2d 683, 688 (1978),
afJ'd, 79 Ill. 2d 26, 402 N.E.2d 194 (1980); accord Mink v. University of Chicago,
460 F. Supp. 713, 719 (N.D. Ill. 1978); see infra notes 96-99 and accompanying text.
In a non-product negligence case, one court recognized that it is perfectly appropri-
ate to compensate emotional injury when it is adequately proven and to deny
recovery when it is not. Ferrara v. Galluchio, 5 N.Y.2d 16, 21, 152 N.E.2d 249, 252,
176 N.Y.S.2d 996, 999-1000 (1958); see infra notes 100-107 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
15. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
16. Id. at 731, 441 P.2d at 914, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 74.
17. Id. at 733, 441 P.2d at 915, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 75. Under the zone of danger
rule, a plaintiff who has not sustained impact may nevertheless recover for emotional
distress caused by witnessing injury to another if he was within the orbit of physical
harm. E.g., Keck v. Jackson, 122 Ariz. 114, 116, 593 P.2d 668, 670 (1979); Strazza v.
McKittrick, 146 Conn. 714, 717-18, 156 A.2d 149, 151 (1959); Shanahan v. Oren-
stein, 52 A.D.2d 164, 167, 383 N.Y.S.2d 327, 329 (1976), appeal dismissed, 40
N.Y.2d 985, 359 N.E.2d 435, 390 N.Y.S.2d 927 (1977); Dave Snelling Lincoln-Mer-
cury v. Simon, 508 S.W.2d 923, 925-26 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974). When the plaintiff
witnesses the accident from a safe distance, however, the zone of danger formulation
is inadequate to permit recovery. E.g., Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 733, 441 P.2d
912, 915, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 75 (1968); Dziokonski v. Babineau, 375 Mass. 555, 564,
380 N.E.2d 1295, 1300 (1978); Sinn v. Burd, 486 Pa. 146, 155-56, 404 A.2d 672,
677-78 (1979).
18. 68 Cal. 2d at 731, 441 P.2d at 914, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 74. The plaintiffs also
alleged injury to the nervous system. Id. at 731, 441 P.2d at 914, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 74.
Injury to the nervous system has been determined to be a physical injury. Espinosa v.
Beverly Hosp., 114 Cal. App. 2d 232, 234, 249 P.2d 843, 844 (1952). The California
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of observing the injuries to her child.10 In order to allow the mother
to recover, the Dillon court adopted the "foreseeable plaintiff" test. 0
The factors enunciated by the court to aid in the determination of
foreseeability were whether the plaintiff (1) was in physical proximity
to the scene of the accident, 21 (2) had a contemporaneous sensory
perception of the accident, 22 and (3) had a close relationship with the
physically injured party.23
courts have liberally interpreted "physical injury" so that according to one commen-
tator "[a]n upset stomach was enough to show harm." Granelli, Mental Distress Tort
Expanded, Nat'l L.J., Sept. 8, 1980, at 3, col. 1. California has abrogated the need to
show any physical harm in permitting recovery for emotional distress to an individ-
ual directly and foreseeably harmed by a negligent act. Molien v. Kaiser Found.
Hosps., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 930-31, 616 P.2d 813, 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831, 839 (1980).
19. 68 Cal. 2d at 731, 441 P.2d at 914, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 74.
20. Id. at 739-41, 4141 P.2d at 919-21, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 79-81.
21. Id. at 740, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80; see Ferriter v. Daniel
O'Connell's Sons, Inc., 413 N.E.2d 690, 696-97 (Mass. 1980). One court found that
the physical proximity requirement was not satisfied when the plaintiff in California
sustained a heart attack upon being informed of an accident that occurred in Hawaii,
Kelley v. Kokua Sales & Supply, Ltd., 56 Hawaii 204, 205-06, 209, 532 P.2d 673,
674-75, 676 (1975).
22. Id. at 740-41, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80. The California courts
have had difficulty consistently applying the "contemporaneous perception" require-
ment. Compare Krouse v. Graham, 19 Cal. 3d 59, 75-76, 562 P.2d 1022, 1029-31,
137 Cal. Rptr. 863, 871-72 (1977) (requirement satisfied when husband saw car
approach his wife, who was in its direct path) and Nazaroff v. Superior Court, 80
Cal. App. 3d 553, 566, 145 Cal. Rptr. 657, 664 (1978) (triable issue of fact presented
on issue of contemporaneous perception when mother arrived just as drowning son
was pulled from pool) and Archibald v. Braverman, 275 Cal. App. 2d 253, 256, 79
Cal. Rptr. 723, 725 (1969) (requirement satisfied when mother arrived within min-
utes after injury to son) with Hathaway v. Superior Court, 112 Cal. App. 3d 728,
736, 169 Cal. Rptr. 435, 440 (1980) (requirement not met when parents arrived
several minutes after injury to son) and Parsons v. Superior Court, 81 Cal. App. 3d
506, 512, 146 Cal. Rptr. 495, 498 (1978) (requirement not satisfied when parents
arrived within seconds after accident to children) and Arauz v. Gerhardt, 68 Cal.
App. 3d 937, 949, 137 Cal. Rptr. 619, 627 (1977) (same). Another problem presented
by the contemporaneous perception requirement is that some events are, by their
nature, incapable of perception. See Justus v. Atchison, 19 Cal. 3d 564, 584-85, 565
P.2d 122, 135-36, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97, 110-11 (1977) (recovery denied to father,
present in delivery room, who could not see or sense death of fetus); Jansen v.
Children's Hosp. Medical Center, 31 Cal. App. 3d 22, 24, 106 Cal. Rptr. 883, 885
(1973) (recovery denied to mother because medical misdiagnosis that led to daugh-
ter's death could not be perceived); Amodio v. Cunningham, 42 Conn. L.J. 1, 5
(Conn. Aug. 12, 1980) (court noted, but did not decide, issue of whether a negligent
diagnosis is susceptible of sensory perception).
23. 68 Cal. 2d at 741, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80. In Dillon, both the
mother and the sister of the victim were allowed to recover for their emotional
distress. Id. at 731 n.1, 748, 441 P.2d at 914 n.1, 925, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 74 n.1, 85.
Subsequently, the California court permitted a foster mother to recover for emo-
tional distress. Mobaldi v. Board of Regents, 55 Cal. App. 3d 573, 582-83, 127 Cal.
Rptr. 720, 726 (1976), overruled on other grounds, Baxter v. Superior Court, 19 Cal.
3d 461, 466 n.4, 563 P.2d 871, 874 n.4, 138 Cal. Rptr. 315, 318 n.4 (1977). In other
[Vol. 50
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Dillon v. Legg has, however, met with mixed reception.24  Al-
though there has been a modest trend toward acceptance of its theory
for recovery, 25 several jurisdictions have limited its application by
imposing additional conditions on recovery.26 Other jurisdictions,
although not rejecting Dillon by name, have denied recover), in simi-
lar fact patterns. 27 Finally, several jurisdictions have expressly de-
jurisdictions, the majority of bystander cases have involved the parent-child relation-
ship. See, e.g., Dziokonski v. Babineau, 375 Mass. 555, 557, 380 N.E.2d 1295, 1296
(1978); Corso v. Merrill, 119 N.H. 647, 649, 406 A.2d 300, 302 (1979); Sinn v. Burd,
486 Pa. 146, 150, 404 A.2d 672, 674 (1979). One court permitted a child to recover
for emotional distress caused by witnessing injury to his step-grandmother. Leong v.
Takasaki, 55 Hawaii 398, 400, 520 P.2d 758, 766 (1974).
24. Simons, Psychic Injury and the Bystander: The Transcontinental Dispute
Between California and New York, 51 St. John's L. Rev. 1, 2 (1976); Note, Reaction
to Dillon v. Legg in California and Other States, 25 Hastings L.J. 1248, 1253-5S
(1974); see Joseph, Dillon's Other Leg: The Extension of the Doctrine Which Permits
Bystander Recovery for Emotional Trauma and Physical Injuries to Actions Based on
Strict Liability in Tort, 18 Duq. L. Rev. 1, 22-42 (1979).
25. See Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Hawaii 398, 409-10, 520 P.2d 758, 765-66 (1974):
Barnhill v. Davis, 300 N.W.2d 104, 106-07 (Iowa 1981); Dziokonski v. Babineau,
375 Mass. 555, 568-69, 380 N.E.2d 1295, 1302-03 (1978): Toms v. McConnell, 45
Mich. App. 647, 653-54, 207 N.W.2d 140, 144 (1973); Corso v. Merrill, 119 N.H.
647, 656, 406 A.2d 300, 306 (1979); Portee v. Jaffee, 84 N.J. 88, 97-98, 417 A.2d 521,
526 (1980); Sinn v. Burd, 486 Pa. 146, 169-73, 404 A.2d 672, 6S4-86 (1979):
D'Ambra v. United States, 114 R.I. 643, 656-58, 338 A.2d 524, 530-31 (1975):
Landreth v. Reed, 570 S.W.2d 486, 489 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978). The lower courts in
Connecticut have split on the issue. Compare D'Amicol v. Alvarez Shipping Co., 31
Conn. Supp. 164, 169, 326 A.2d 129, 132 (Super. Ct. 1973) (accepting Dillon) with
McGovern v. Piccolo, 33 Conn. Supp. 225, 228-29, 372 A.2d 989, 991 (Super. Ct.
1976) (rejecting Dillon).
26. One court allows a witness to recover for emotional distress only when the
victim suffers serious injury or death. Portee v. Jaffee, 84 N.J. 88, 100-01, 417 A.2d
521, 527-28 (1980). Other courts require that, to be compensable, the emotional
injury must be of a kind that would be suffered by a person "'normally constituted."
Leong v. Takasald, 55 Hawaii 398, 408, 520 P.2d 758, 764 (1974); Sinn v. Burd, 486
Pa. 146, 168, 404 A.2d 672, 683 (1979); D'Ambra v. United States, 114 R.I. 643,
652-53 & n.4, 338 A.2d 524, 529 & n.4 (1975); cf. Rodrigues v. State, 52 Hawaii 156,
173, 472 P.2d 509, 520 (1970) (in non-bystander case, plaintiff must be normally
constituted to recover for emotional distress); Hunslev v. Giard, 87 Wash. 2d 424,
436-37, 553 P.2d 1096, 1103 (1976) (same). Limiting damages to those that would be
suffered by an individual "normally constituted" would nullify the "thin skull" rule
in emotional distress cases. Miller, The Scope of Liability for Negligent Infliction of
Emotional Distress: Making "the Punishment Fit the Crime", 1 U. Hawaii L. Rev. 1,
37-38 (1980). The "thin skull" rule provides that the negligent defendant must take
the victim as he finds him, with any peculiar vulnerabilities. N1. Prosser, supra note
1, at 260-63. Thus, when defendant's conduct results in impact on the plaintiff, he is
liable for all consequences proximately caused by the conduct. Id. at 261. One writer
has suggested that, while the "thin skull" rule may "'produce just results in cases
involving physical injury, it is not so sacrosanct that it might not be sacrificed in
order to yield greater justice in mental-distress cases." Miller, supra, at 38 (footnote
omitted).
27. Owens v. Childrens Memorial Hosp., 480 F.2d 465, 467-68 (8th Cir. 1973)
(applying Nebraska law) (parents denied recovery when their son died while under
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clined to follow the California lead in allowing recovery for emotional
distress to bystanders who were outside the zone of danger.28
The principal concern articulated by the courts that have rejected
Dillon is the difficulty of limiting liability. 29 For instance, the New
York Court of Appeals, in Tobin v. Grossman,30 expressed the fear
that
[i]f foreseeability be the sole test, then once liability is extended the
logic of the principle would not and could not remain confined. It
would extend to older children, fathers, grandparents, relatives, or
others in loco parentis, and even to sensitive caretakers, or ... any
other affected bystanders. Moreover, in any one accident, there
might well be more than one person indirectly but seriously af-
fected by the shock of injury or death to the child. 3'
The Tobin court, in denying recovery to a mother in a situation
similar to that in Dillon,32 stated:
the defendants' medical care); Young v. Caribbean Assocs., 358 F. Supp. 1220,
1221-22 (D.V.I. 1973) (father denied recovery after witnessing his son suffer severe
burns); Woodman v. Dever, 367 So. 2d 1061, 1063 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979)
(daughter denied recovery for emotional distress after witnessing assault on her
mother); Strickland v. Hodges, 134 Ga. App. 909, 913, 216 S.E.2d 706, 709 (1975)
(parents denied recovery for emotional distress when they learned of accident to child
but did not witness it) (citing with approval Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 249
N.E.2d 419, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1969)); Steele v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 371
So. 2d 843, 852 (La. App. 1979) (husband denied recovery for mental anguish
resulting from wife having undergone unnecessary hysterectomy due to misdiag-
nosis). Other jurisdictions that denied recovery to a bystander before the California
decision in Dillon v. Legg have not reversed their precedent since Dillon. Resavage v.
Davies, 199 Md. 479, 484, 86 A.2d 879, 883 (1952) (mother denied recovery for
emotional distress when she witnessed her daughter being hit by a car), Waubev.
Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 614, 258 N.W. 497, 501 (1935) (administrator not per-
mitted to recover on behalf of mother who died several clays after witnessing a fatal
injury to her child).
28. Welsh v. Davis, 307 F. Supp. 416, 417 (D. Mont. 1969); Stadler v. Cross, 295
N.W.2d 552, 555 (Minn. 1980); Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 619, 249 N.E.2d
419, 424, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554, 561 (1969); Whetham v. Bismarck Hosp., 197 N.W.2d
678, 684 (N.D. 1972); Guilmette v. Alexander, 128 Vt. 116, 118-20, 259 A.2d 12,
14-15 (1969); Grimsby v. Samson, 85 Wash. 2d 52, 57. 530 P.2d 291, 294 (1975).
29. Stadler v. Cross. 295 N.W.2d 552, 555 (Minn. 1980); Tobin v. Grossman, 24
N.Y.2d 609, 618-19, 249 N.E.2d 419, 424, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554, 561 (1969); Grimsby v.
Samson, 85 Wash. 2d 52, 57, 530 P.2d 291, 294 (1975); see Young v. Caribbean
Assocs., 358 F. Supp. 1220, 1222 (D.V.I. 1973); Amodio v. Cunningham, 42 Conn.
L.J. 1, 5 (Conn. Aug. 12, 1980); Resavage v. Davies, 199 Md. 479, 487, 86 A.2d 879,
883 (1952).
30. 24 N.Y.2d 609, 249 N.E.2d 419, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1969).
31. Id. at 616, 249 N.E.2d at 423, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 559; accord Grimsby v.
Samson, 85 Wash. 2d 52, 57, 530 P.2d 291, 294 (1975).
32. In Tobin, the record revealed that the mother was not an actual eyewitness
to the automobile accident in which her son was injured. Instead, she heard the
screech of brakes and arrived at the scene immediately after the accident to see her
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Every injury has ramifying consequences, like the ripplings of the
waters, without end. The problem for the law is to limit the legal
consequences of wrongs to a controllable degree. The risks of indi-
rect harm from the loss or injury of loved ones is pervasive and
inevitably realized at one time or another. Only a very small part
of that risk is brought about by the culpable acts of others. This is
the risk of living and bearing children. It is enough that the law
establishes liability in favor of those directly or intentionally
harmed.3 3
Rejection of bystander recovery in non-product negligence also rests
upon the recognition of a need for a test that can be easily and
consistently applied. 34 The foreseeable plaintiff test proposed in Dil-
lon v. Legg has not provided a workable solution to the problem of
bystander recovery for emotional distress in negligence.3 5
B. Recovery for Emotional Distress in Products Liability
The precedent provided by non-product negligence has been used
by a California court to permit recovery for emotional distress in
products liability. In Shepard v. Superior Court,36 a family was riding
in its automobile, which was hit by another vehicle. The rear door
opened, due to a defective locking mechanism, and the daughter fell
onto the highway. She was killed when struck by an oncoming car.37
The parents and brother sued the manufacturer in implied warranty
and strict liability for their emotional injuries.38 The court extended
the negligence analysis of Dillon v. Legg to products liability by
injudiciously characterizing the family as bystanders.3 9
By expanding liability in product cases to a new and potentially
unlimited class of plaintiffs, the bystander analysis in Shepard is
inherently unacceptable to some jurisdictions. Characterization of
emotionally harmed third parties as bystanders, therefore, creates
unnecessary obstacles to recovery in products liability. The specter of
son lying injured on the ground. 24 N.Y.2d at 611, 249 N.E.2d at 419, 301 N.Y.S.2d
at 554-55. The court, in rejecting Dillon, made it clear that the mother would have
been denied recovery even if she had witnessed the accident. Id. at 619, 249 N.E.2d
at 424, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 561-62.
33. Id. at 619, 249 N.E.2d at 424, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 561-62.
34. Stadler v. Cross, 295 N.W.2d 552, 554 (Minn. 1980); Grimsby v. Samson, 85
Wash. 2d 52, 56-57, 530 P.2d 291, 293-94 (1975).
35. Stadler v. Cross, 295 N.W.2d 552, 555 (Minn. 1980); Tobin v. Grossman, 24
N.Y.2d 609, 619, 249 N.E.2d 419, 424, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554, 561 (1969); Grimsby v.
Samson, 85 Wash. 2d 52, 57, 530 P.2d 291, 294 (1975).
36. 76 Cal. App. 3d 16, 142 Cal. Rptr. 612 (1977).
37. Id. at 18-19, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 613-14.
38. Id. at 18, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 613. Plaintiffs also alleged physical injuries,
without enumerating them. Id.
39. Id. at 20-21, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 614-15.
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uncontrollable liability raised in non-product negligence applies with
equal force in products liability. 40  Moreover, courts and commenta-
tors have expressed the fear that increased liability caused by evolving
products law will adversely affect manufacturing enterprises. 41 Leg-
islatures have responded by enacting statutes to curb the manufac-
turer's potentially burgeoning liability. 42  Such concern is also im-
plicit in decisions such as Vaccaro v. Squibb Corp.43
In Vaccaro, a mother was administered a drug designed to prevent
miscarriage. She subsequently gave birth to a child with severe physi-
cal deformities. The parents sued the drug manufacturer, alleging
40. See Miller, supra note 26, at 35-36; Traynor, supra note 4, at 376.
41. Helene Curtis Indus. v. Pruitt, 385 F.2d 841, 863 (5th Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 391 U.S. 913 (1968); Shepard v. Superior Court, 76 Cal. App. 3d 16, 26-29.,
142 Cal. Rptr. 612, 619-20 (1977) (Kane, J., dissenting); R. Epstein, Modern Prod-
ucts Liability Law 46-48 (1980); Birnbaum, Legislative Reform or Retreat? A Re-
sponse to the Product Liability Crisis, 14 Forum 251, 251-53 (1978); Holford, The
Limits of Strict Liability for Product Design and Manufacture, 52 Tex. L. Rev. 81,
87 (1973). Once on the market, a defective product reaches a vast number of
potential plaintiffs. One commentator noted that one court's decision can brand
thousands of products defective. Epstein, Products Liability: The Search for the
Middle Ground, 56 N.C. L. Rev. 643, 657-58 (1978). Moreover, strict liability was
adopted to relieve the plaintiff of the onerous burden of proof in negligence. Butaud
v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42, 43-44 (Alaska 1976);
Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 133, 501 P.2d 1153, 1162, 104 Cal.
Rptr. 433, 442 (1972); see Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 343, 363
A.2d 955, 958 (1976); Gast v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 39 Ohio St. 2d 29, 31, 313
N.E.2d 831, 833 (19741); Morningstar v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 253 S.E.2d 666,
677 (W. Va. 1979); Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 459-60, 155 N.W.2d 55, 63
(1967); Birnbaum, supra, at 251; Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for
Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 825-26 (1973).
42. Birnbaum, supra note 41, at 251-52. Statutes of repose, which establish a time
limit on liability based on the age of the product rather than date of injury, are an
example of such legislative attempts to confine the manufacturer's liability. E.g., Or.
Rev. Stat. § 30.905 (1979); Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-3(1) (1977). Other examples
include statutes that create either a rebuttable presumption or a defense that the
manufacturer has complied with the existing technology in the preparation of his
product. E.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-403 (Supp. 1978) ("state of the art" presump-
tion); Ind. Code Ann. § 34-4-20-4 (Burns Supp. 1979) ("state of the art" defense).
Statutes have also been enacted that apply principles of comparative fault to products
liability actions, thereby reducing a manufacturer's liability by apportioning fault
between the parties involved. E.g., Minn. Stat. Ann. § 604.01 (West 1981); N.Y.
Civ. Prac. Law § 1411 (McKinney 1976). In response to a "crisis" in the field of
products liability resulting from the dramatic rise in the cost of products liability
insurance, the United States Department of Commerce formed a task force to investi-
gate the problems and propose solutions. Birnbaum, supra note 41, at 251 n.5;
Schwartz, The Federal Government and the Product Liability Problem: From Task-
Force Investigation to Decisions by the Administration, 47 Cin. L. Rev. 573, 574
(1978).
43. 71 A.D.2d 270, 422 N.Y.S.2d 679 (1979), rev'd, 52 N.Y.2d 809, 418 N.E.2d
386, 436 N.Y.S.2d 871 (1980).
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that the child's deformities were caused by the drug. 44 They sought
damages for their emotional injuries45 in negligence, breach of war-
ranty and strict liability in tort.46 The Appellate Division recognized
the mother's cause of action, 47 finding that the manufacturer
breached a duty owed directly to the mother. 48  The Court of Appeals
reversed 49 on the ground that New York does not permit recovery for
emotional harm to a bystander.,50
The Vaccaro decision clearly indicates that jurisdictions that are
reluctant to permit recovery for bystander emotional distress in non-
product negligence cases5' will not allow such recovery in products
liability. 2 In an attempt to circumscribe a manufacturer's liability,
however, recovery may be denied to a plaintiff who is worthy of
redress under established tort principles. 53  Denial of recovery for
third party emotional distress need not be absolute. A proper balance
between the need for adequate recovery and the desire to protect the
manufacturing enterprises can be attained by limiting recovery for
emotional distress to a third party who is also a user of the product.
44. Id. at 272, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 680.
45. Id. The plaintiffs commenced two actions against the drug manufacturer,
the physician, and the hospital. The first action, brought by the infant's guardian,
sought damages against these defendants. The second action sought recovery for
emotional injury and extreme mental anguish against all defendants on ten counts.
Vaccaro v. Squibb Corp., 97 Misc. 2d 907, 908-10, 412 N.Y.S.2d 722, 723-24 (Sup.
Ct. 1978), aff'd, 71 A.D.2d 270, 422 N.Y.S.2d 679 (1979), rev'd, 52 N.Y.2d 809, 418
N.E.2d 386, 436 N.Y.S.2d 871 (1980). The Supreme Court denied defendants' mo-
tions to dismiss nine of the ten counts. Id. at 919, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 730.
46. 97 Misc. 2d at 908, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 723.
47. 71 A.D.2d at 277-78, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 683-84 (1979). The father's cause of
action for emotional distress was dismissed, but his cause of action for loss of consor-
tium was sustained. Id.
48. Id. at 277, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 683.
49. 52 N.Y.2d 809, 418 N.E.2d 386, 436 N.Y.S.2d 871 (1980).
50. See infra notes 57-61 and accompanying text.
51. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
52. See Woodill v. Parke Davis & Co., 58 Il. App. 3d 349, 355, 374 N.E.2d 683,
687-88, af'd, 79 Ill. 2d 26, 402 N.E.2d 194 (1980); Vaccaro v. Squibb Corp., 52
N.Y.2d 809, 809, 418 N.E.2d 386, 386, 436 N.Y.S.2d 871, 871 (1980).
53. See Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 619, 249 N.E.2d 419, 424-26, 301
N.Y.S.2d 554, 562-63 (1969) (Keating, J., dissenting); Joseph, supra note 24, at
14-15.
54. Helene Curtis Indus., v. Pruitt, 385 F.2d 841, 862 (5th Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 391 U.S. 913 (1968); Singer v. Walker, 39 A.D.2d 90, 97, 331 N.Y.S.2d 823,
831 (1972), aff'd per curiam, 32 N.Y.2d 786, 298 N.E.2d 681, 345 N.Y.S.2d 542
(1973); Epstein, supra note 41, at 658-62; Green, Should the Manufacturer of Gen-
eral Products be Liable Without Negligence?, 24 Tenn. L. Rev. 928, 937 (1957):
McKean, Products Liability: Trends and Implications, 38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 3, 61
(1970); Wilson, Products Liability, 43 Calif. L. Rev. 809, 809 (1955).
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II. PRoPER CHARACTERIZATION OF PLAINTIFFS
A. Allaying Fears of Unlimited Liability
The New York Court of Appeals has asserted that "the law must
establish, circumscribe and limit the rules ascribing liability in a
manner which accords with reason and practicality. '"5 , In a well-
reasoned opinion, the intermediate court in Vaccaro recognized that
[r]estricting liability to the mother [who used the drug] will hold a
strict rein on liability and provide a reasonably objective test ....
There is no danger that a larger class might become involved
.... [Therefore,] [t]he imagined difficulty of circumscribing...
liability is overcome .... [and] "the rationale underlying the
Tobin case, namely, the real dangers of extending recovery for
harm to others than those directly involved, is inapplicable to the
instant case. "' s
The New York Court of Appeals was apparently unpersuaded by this
rationale v In citing Howard v. Lecher,56 the majority, 5 over a
strong dissent, 60 summarily placed Mrs. Vaccaro in the bystander
category and refused to acknowledge that the defendant owed her any
duty whatsoever.6'
Howard has, however, been strongly criticized. 62 Its reliance on
Tobin v. Grossman63 was misplaced because in Howard there existed
55. Howard v. Lecher, 42 N.Y.2d 109, 112, 366 N.E.2d 64, 66, 397 N.Y.S.2d
363, 365 (1977).
56. Vaccaro v. Squibb Corp., 71 A.D.2d 270, 277-78, 422 N.Y.S.2d 679, 683-84
(1979) (citations omitted) (quoting Johnson v. State, 37 N.Y.2d 378, 383, 372
N.Y.S.2d 638, 643, 334 N.E.2d 590, 593 (1975)), rev'd, 52 N.Y.2d 809, 418 N.E.2d
386, 436 N.Y.S.2d 871 (1980).
57. Vaccaro v. Squibb Corp., 52 N.Y.2d 809, 810, 418 N.E.2d 386, 386, 436
N.Y.S.2d 871, 871 (1980).
58. 42 N.Y.2d 109, 366 N.E.2d 64, 397 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1977). In Howard, the
parents of a child born with Tay-Sachs disease sued their doctor in negligence for
failing to inform them of the high risk that their child would be born with this
disease. Id. at 110, 366 N.E.2d at 64-65, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 364. The majority, citing
Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554, 249 N.E.2d 419 (1969),
denied the parents recovery for the emotional distress they experienced at seeing their
child suffer. 42 N.Y.2d at 113, 366 N.E.2d at 66, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 365-66.
59. Vaccaro v. Squibb Corp., 52 N.Y.2d 809, 810, 418 N.E.2d 386, 386, 436
N.Y.S.2d 871, 871 (1980).
60. Id. at 811-12, 418 N.E.2d at 386-87, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 871-72 (Fuchsberg, J.,
dissenting).
61. See id. at 811, 418 N.E.2d at 386-87, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 872.
62. Birnbaum & Rheingold, Torts, 1977 Survey of New York Law, 29 Syracuse
L. Rev. 593, 605-09 (1978); Capron, Tort Liability in Genetic Counseling, 79
Colum. L. Rev. 618, 639-42 (1979); Note, Wrongful Birth and Emotional Distress
Damages: A Suggested Approach, 38 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 550, 553-55 (1977); 24 N.Y.L.
Sch. L. Rev. 502, 510-12 (1978).
63. 24 N.Y.2d 609, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554, 249 N.E.2d 419 (1969).
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a duty to the plaintiff mother that would have adequately circum-
scribed liability.6 4 In any event, the reasoning of the Howard major-
ity is inapplicable to the situation presented in Vaccaro. The Howard
facts apparently did not warrant the imposition of a duty that would
result in compensation of one plaintiff and not the other.65 In Vac-
caro, however, the duty owed by the manufacturer w'as more readily
cognizable.6 6 Only the mother consumed the drug 7 and liability was
with certainty limited by the duty owed only to her."- All others
harmed were mere bystanders, as was correctly deduced with respect
to the father by the lower court 69 and the dissenter in the Court of
Appeals.70
The failure of the Court of Appeals to adequately consider this
matter is a retreat to the inviolate sanctuary of Tobin v. Grossman."t
It was equally improper for the California court to extend the Dillon
bystander analysis to the facts presented in Shepard.-,2 It is crucial
that a court correctly determine whether the plaintiff is only a by-
stander or whether he is a user. While at first blush all three-party
cases may appear to be bystander situations, the spuriousness of this
characterization quickly becomes apparent. 73  A bystander is a pas-
64. 42 N.Y.2d at 116, 366 N.E.2d at 68, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 368 (Cooke, J.,
dissenting).
65. See id. at 113, 366 N.E.2d at 66, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 365-66. The Howard court
concluded that it could not distinguish between the injuries suffered by the mother
and the father. Id. In addition, the doctor's nonfeasance in failing to take both
parents' genealogical history and evaluate it properly was not the direct cause of the
child's illness. Id. at 110-11, 366 N.E.2d at 65, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 364. In dictum, the
majority posited a hypothetical in which the doctor committed an act of misfeasance
by causing injuries to the child during delivery, and stated that in such a case, the
parents still could n6t recover for their emotional distress. Id. at 112-13. 366 N.E.2d
at 66, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 365. The Appellate Division in Vaccaro, however, distin-
guished this dictum on the grounds that the duty breached would be one owed to the
child. Vaccaro v. Squibb Corp., 71 A.D.2d 270, 275, 422 N.Y.S.2d 679, 682 (1979),
rev'd, 52 N.Y.2d 809, 418 N.E.2d 386, 436 N.Y.S.2d 871 (1980). In Vaccaro,
however, the mother's injury was the result of a breach of a duty owed directly to
her. Id. In addition, whether administration of the drug to Mrs. Vaccaro throughout
her pregnancy was the direct cause of the injuries to her child was a genuine question
of fact. Id.
66. 71 A.D.2d at 274, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 682.
67. 52 N.Y.2d at 811-12, 418 N.E.2d at 387, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 872 (Fuchsberg, J.,
dissenting).
68. See id.
69. See 71 A.D.2d at 278, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 684.
70. 52 N.Y.2d at 811-12, 418 N.E.2d at 386-87, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 872 (Fuchsberg,
J., dissenting).
71. Id. at 811 & n.*, 418 N.E.2d at 387 & n.', 436 N.Y.S.2d at 872 & n.*.
72. See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
73. See Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 921-23, 616 P.2d 813,
815-17, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831, 833-35 (1980); Howard v. Lecher, 42 N.Y.2d 109,
116-17, 366 N.E.2d 64, 68-69, 397 N.Y.S.2d 363, 367-68 (1977) (Cooke, J., dissent-
ing); Note, supra note 62, at 555.
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sive onlooker, 4 while users may be defined as that class of persons
using a product 75 for the purposes for which it was intended.70
Circumscribed by the clearly recognizable duty owed by a manufac-
turer to the user of its product, liability to the user is eminently
reasonable and practical.
B. Basis for User Recovery in Products Liability
1. Duty and Causation
Manufacturers clearly owe a duty to all users to ensure that the
product will not be unreasonably dangerous. 77  The manufacturer
advertises the product, 7s creates a demand for it, 70 and expects the
74. Singer v. Walker, 39 A.D.2d 90, 95, 331 N.Y.S.2d 823, 828 (1972), aJJ d per
curiam, 32 N.Y.2d 786, 298 N.E.2d 681, 345 N.Y.S.2d 542 (1973).
75. See Vaccaro v. Squibb Corp., 52 N.Y.2d 809, 811-12, 418 N.E.2d 386, 387,
436 N.Y.S.2d 871, 872 (1980) (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting); supra note 7; cf. Howard v.
Lecher, 42 N.Y.2d 109, 116-17, 366 N.E.2d 64, 68, 397 N.Y.S.2d 363, 367-68 (1977)
(Cooke, J., dissenting) (in non-product negligence, patient to whom physician owed
a direct duty was not a bystander); Johnson v. State, 37 N.Y.2d 378, 382-83, 334
N.E.2d 590, 593, 372 N.Y.S.2d 638, 642 (1975) (in non-product negligence, patient's
daughter, to whom hospital owed a direct duty, was not a bystander); Molien v.
Kaiser Found. Hosps., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 921-23, 616 P.2d 813, 815-17, 167 Cal. Rptr.
831, 833-35 (1980) (in non-product negligence, Dillon held inapplicable because
plaintiff was direct victim of the negligent act).
76. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 64, 377 P.2d 897, 901,
27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1963); Singer v. Walker, 39 A.D.2d 90, 93-94, 331 N.Y.S.2d
823, 827 (1972).
77. The Second Restatement of Torts refers to a "product in a defective condition
unreasonaby dangerous." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A(1) (1965). Contro-
versy exists as to whether a plaintiff must prove that a product is both defective and
unreasonably dangerous. Most courts require proof of both. E.g., Serpiello v. Yoder
Co., 418 F. Supp. 70, 71-72 (E.D. Pa. 1976), aff'd mem., 556 F.2d 568 (3d Cir.
1977); Rogers v. Unimac Co., 115 Ariz. 304, 306-07, 565 P.2d 181, 183-84 (1977);
Aller v. Rodgers Mach. Mfg. Co., 268 N.W.2d 830, 835 (Iowa 1978); Phipps v.
General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 344, 363 A.2d 955, 958-59 (1976); Dippel v.
Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 460, 155 N.W.2d 55, 63 (1967). Other courts, however,
require proof of the existence of a defect only. E.g., Butaud v. Suburban Marine &
Sporting Goods, Inc., 543 P.2d 209, 213-14 (Alaska 1975); Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson
Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 132-33, 501 P.2d 1153, 1161-62, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433, 441-42
(1972); Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 176, 406 A.2d 140,
153 (1979).
78. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 467, 150 P.2d 436, 443
(1944) (Traynor, J., concurring); First Nat'l Bank v. Nor-Am Agricultural Prods.,
Inc., 88 N.M. 74, 87, 537 P.2d 682, 695 (1975); Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American
Cyanamid Co., 11 N.Y.2d 5, 12-13, 181 N.E.2d 399, 402, 226 N.Y.S.2d 363, 367-68
(1962); Tedder v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 270 N.C. 301, 305-06, 154 S.E.2d 337,
340 (1967); Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St. 244, 248-49, 147
N.E.2d 612, 615 (1958); General Motors Corp. v. Dodson, 47 Tenn. App. 438, 460,
338 S.W.2d 655, 665 (1960); Jacob E. Decker & Sons v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 619,
164 S.W.2d 828, 832-33 (1942).
79. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 385, 161 A.2d 69, 84
(1960); Tedder v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 270 N.C. 301, 305-06, 154 S.E.2d 337,
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consumer to purchase it.s0 By this conduct, and by the mere presence
of the product on the marketplace,8' the manufacturer assumes a duty
to the user of that product. sA 2 Such a duty was owed by the drug
company in Vaccaro.s3 As the intermediate court recognized, the
duty of the drug company was manifest: "It manufactured, sold and
distributed the drug designed to prevent miscarriage." 8 4 The duty
was owed directly to the mother because "[i]t was she who was
injected with the drug, which was prescribed and administered to
her" throughout her pregnancy. s5  Similarly, in Shepard, it was
recognized that the automobile manufacturer owed a duty to the
family riding in the automobile. 6
Once a duty is breached, the manufacturer should be liable to the
user for all injuries caused by the defective product. 8- In products
340 (1967); Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 168 Wash. 456, 462-63, 12 P.2d 409, 412
(1932).
80. Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St. 244, 248-49. 147 N.E.2d
612, 615-16 (1958); Klages v. General Ordnance Equip. Corp., 240 Pa. Super. Ct.
356, 364-65, 367 A.2d 304, 308-09 (1976): Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 168 Wash. 456,
462-63, 12 P.2d 409, 412 (1932).
81. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63, 377 P.2d 897, 901,
27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1963); Conder v. Hull Lift Truck, Inc., 405 N.E.2d 538. 544
(Ind. Ct. App. 1980); Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 352, 363 A.2d
955, 963 (1976); H. Melick, The Sale of Food and Drink 154 (1936): Shapo, A
Representational Theory of Consumer Protection: Doctrine. Function and Legal
Liability for Product Disappointment, 60 Va. L. Rev. 1109, 1129-31, 1243-46 (1974).
82. Hertzler v. Manshum, 228 Mich. 416, 422, 200 N.W. 155. 156 (1924):
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 384, 161 A.2d 69, 84 (1960):
Race v. Krum, 222 N.Y. 410, 415, 118 N.E. 853, 853-54 (1918): Parish v. Great Atl.
& Pac. Tea Co., 13 Misc. 2d 33, 62-63, 177 N.Y.S.2d 7, 36-37 (Mun. Ct. N.Y. 1958);
Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Corp., 6 Ohio St. 2d 227, 230, 235-36. 218 N.E.2d 185.
188, 191-92 (1966); Markle v. Mulholland's, Inc., 265 Or. 259, 266-67, 509 P.2d 529,
532 (1973); Hamilton v. Motor Coach Indus., 569 S.W.2d 571, 575 (Tex. Civ. App.
1978). The Second Restatement of Torts provides that "'the justification for the strict
liability has been said to be that the seller, by marketing his product for use and
consumption, has undertaken and assumed a special responsibility toward any mem-
ber of the consuming public who may be injured by it." Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 402A comment c (1965). In discussing the liability of a manufacturer of
adulterated foodstuffs, one commentator noted that "'[t]he manufacturer who places
food or drink upon the market in sealed containers has, by such means (and especially
by his advertising or printed labels), intentionally brought himself into direct rela-
tionship with the ultimate purchaser. . . . [The manufacturer's] representations
announce the assumption... of a duty to make reparation directly to ... the public
purchasing the product .... H. Melick, supra note 81, at 154-55 (footnote omit-
ted).
83. 71 A.D.2d 270, 422 N.Y.S.2d 679 (1979), rev'd, 52 N.Y.2d 809, 418 N.E.2d
386, 436 N.Y.S.2d 871 (1980).
84. Id. at 274, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 682.
85. Id. at 276, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 682.
86. Shepard v. Superior Court, 76 Cal. App. 3d 16, 20, 142 Cal. Rptr. 612, 614
(1977).
87. 2 L. Frumer & M. Friedman, supra note 3, at 3B-88 to -88.1. In order for a
plaintiff to recover in a products liability action, he must prove causation in fact,
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liability it is not necessary that, for a defective product to be the legal
cause of an injury, either the particular injury88 or the manner in
which it occurred89 be foreseeable. Rather, the focus is on whether
the use of the product was reasonably foreseeable.90
In Vaccaro, the mother clearly was utilizing the drug for the precise
purpose for which it was intended.91 Similarly, in Shepard, transpor-
tation of people was the foreseeable use of the family automobile.
2
Additionally, there was no misuse of the product in either case. 3
When the use of the product is foreseeable, the fact that the injury
sustained was emotional, rather than physical, should not be determi-
native in assessing liability.
i.e., that the injury complained of was the result of a defective product, and that the
defect can be traced to the manufacturer. Id. Additionally, the plaintiff must prove
proximate, or "legal," cause. Rogers v. Unimac Co., 115 Ariz. 304, 309, 565 P.2d
181, 185 (1977); Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 127, 501 P.2d 1153,
1157, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433, 437 (1972); Bradford v. Bendix-Westinghouse Automotive
Air Brake Co., 33 Colo. App. 99, 111, 517 P.2d 406, 413 (1973); Kirkland v. General
Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353, 1363 (Okla. 1974). In non-product negligence, the
general rule that a tortfeasor is responsible for all the natural and proximate causes of
his negligent act has been applied to permit recovery for emotional harm. E.g.,
Johnson v. State, 37 N.Y.2d 378, 383-84, 334 N.E.2d 590, 593, 372 N.Y.S.2d 638,
642 (1975); Barnette v. Dickens, 205 Va. 12, 16, 135 S.E.2d 109, 113 (1964). When
the plaintiff's conduct breaks the chain of causation and becomes the primary cause
of the injury, however, proximate cause is not present. For example, the failure to
repair a product, or misuse of the product, can constitute an intervening and super-
ceding cause of the injury. E.g., Greiner v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 429
F. Supp. 495, 497 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Rogers v. Unimac, 115 Ariz. 304, 309, 565 P.2d
181, 186 (1977). See generally Twerski, The Many Faces of Misuse: An Inquiry Into
the Emerging Doctrine of Comparative Causation, 29 Mercer L. Rev. 403, 420-26
(1978).
88. Eshbach v. W.T. Grant's & Co., 481 F.2d 940, 942-43 (3d Cir. 1973);
Newman v. Utility Trailer & Equip. Co., 278 Or. 395, 397-400, 564 P.2d 674,
675-76 (1977); cf. Roberts v. United States, 316 F.2d 489, 495 (3d Cir. 1963) (in
non-product negligence, defendant not required to foresee the precise injury that
occurred in order to be liable); Barnette v. Dickens, 205 Va. 12, 16, 135 S.E.2d 109,
112-13 (1964) (same).
89. Eshbach v. W.T. Grant's & Co., 481 F.2d 940, 943 (3d Cir. 1973); Dorsey v.
Yoder Co., 331 F. Supp. 753, 768 (E.D. Pa. 1971), affid, 474 F.2d 1339 (3d Cir.
1973); Comstock v. General Motors Corp., 358 Mich. 163, 180, 99 N.W.2d 627, 636
(1959); Tucci v. Bossert, 53 A.D.2d 291, 293, 385 N.Y.S.2d 328, 330-31 (1976);
Smith v. J.C. Penney Co., 269 Or. 643, 659, 525 P.2d 1299, 1306-07 (1974).
90. LeBouef v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 623 F.2d 985, 989 (5th Cir. 1980);
Eshbach v. W.T. Grant's & Co., 481 F.2d 940, 943 (3d Cir. 1973); DeRosa v.
Remington Arms Co., 509 F. Supp. 762, 768-69 (E.D.N.Y. 1981); Derrick v. Yoder
Co., 88 Ill. App. 3d 864, 873, 410 N.E.2d 1030, 1036 (1980); Newman v. Utility
Trailer & Equip. Co., 278 Or. 395, 399, 564 P.2d 674, 676 (1977).
91. Vaccaro v. Squibb Corp., 71 A.D.2d 270, 274, 422 N.Y.S.2d 679, 682
(1979), rev'd, 52 N.Y.2d 809, 418 N.E.2d 386, 436 N.Y.S.2d 871 (1980).
92. See Shepard v. Superior Court, 76 Cal. App. 3d 16, 20, 142 Cal. Rptr. 612,
614-15 (1977).
93. See id.; Vaccaro v. Squibb Corp., 71 A.D.2d 270, 274, 422 N.Y.S.2d 679,
682 (1979), rev'd, 52 N.Y.2d 809, 418 N.E.2d 386, 436 N.Y.S.2d 871 (1980). A
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2. Nature of the Injury
It is a futile exercise to attempt to categorize an injury as discretely
emotional or physical. 94 The Court of Appeals in Vaccaro, however,
denied recovery to the mother on the additional ground that she did
not allege independent physical injuries. 95 Similarly, in Woodill v.
Parke Davis & Co. ,96 an Illinois appellate court denied recovery in a
situation similar to Vaccaro by relying on section 402A of the Second
Restatement of Torts.97 That section provides: "One who sells any
product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or
consumer... is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused
to the ultimate user or consumer . "..."98 After quoting section
402A, the Woodill court summarily concluded that "the Restatement
did not intend a strict liability action for mental anguish or emotional
distress."99
The Woodill court's construction of the term "physical harm" is
erroneous. The comments to section 402A are silent on the proper
interpretation of "physical harm." To ascertain the scope of its mean-
ing, reference to section 436A, °00 concerning emotional distress in
plaintiffs misuse of a product, such as failure to read and follow instructions, will
relieve the manufacturer from liability. See Poches v. J.J. Newberr' Co., 549 F.2d
1166, 1168 (8th Cir. 1977); McDevitt v. Standard Oil Co., 391 F.2d 364, 369 (5th
Cir. 1968); Hawkeye Sec. Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 199 N.W.2d 373, 381 (Iowa
1972). Conduct regarded as foreseeable use in one jurisdiction may be misuse in
another. Compare LeBouef v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 451 F. Supp. 253, 257
(W.D. La. 1978) (driving at excessive speed foreseeable use), aff'd, 623 F.2d 985 (5th
Cir. 1980) with Hoelter v. Mohawk Serv., Inc., 170 Conn. 495, 497-98, 506, 365
A.2d 1064, 1066, 1069 (1976) (excessive speed was such misuse as to preclude recov-
ery).
94. D'Ambra v. United States, 396 F. Supp. 1180, 1184 (D.R.I. 1973); Molien v.
Kaiser Found. Hosps., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 929, 616 P.2d 813, 820-21, 167 Cal. Rptr.
831, 838-39 (1980); Sloane v. Southern Cal. Ry., 111 Cal. 668, 680, 44 P. 320, 322
(1896); Gay v. A & P Food Stores, 39 Misc. 2d 360, 364, 240 N.Y.S.2d 809, 813 (Civ.
Ct. N.Y. 1963); Brickner, The Psychology of Disability, in Traumatic Medicine and
Surgery for the Attorney 65 (P. Cantor ed. Supp. 1964); Comment, Negligently
Inflicted Mental Distress: The Case for an Independent Tort, 59 Geo. L.J. 1237,
1259 n.128 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Independent Tort].
95. Vaccaro v. Squibb Corp., 52 N.Y.2d 809, 810, 418 N.E.2d 386, 386, 436
N.Y.S.2d 871, 871 (1980). The dissent argued that the plaintiff did in fact rely on
physical injuries, in that the record described injuries to her nervous system, vomit-
ing, and nausea. Id. at 811, 418 N.E.2d at 387, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 872.
96. 58 Ill. App. 3d 349, 374 N.E.2d 683 (1978), aJf'd, 79 Ill. 2d 26, 402 N.E.2d
194 (1980).
97. Id. at 355, 374 N.E.2d at 688.
98. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A(1) (1965).
99. 58 M11. App. 3d at 355, 374 N.E.2d at 688; accord Mink v. University of
Chicago, 460 F. Supp. 713, 719 (N.D. Ill. 1978); Shepard v. Superior Court, 76 Cal.
App. 3d 16, 23, 142 Cal. Rptr. 612, 616 (1977) (Kane, J., dissenting).
100. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 436A (1965).
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negligence, is instructive. Comment c to that section defines bodily
harm to include recurring symptoms such as nausea and long-term
mental disturbances, "notwithstanding their mental character."''
In accordance with the Restatement, courts in non-product negli-
gence cases have liberally construed physical harm as including emo-
tional disturbances. 10 2
101. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 436A comment c (1965). One commentator
has suggested that because the Restatement requires proof of causation, but not
contact with the plaintiff, emotional distress manifested by objective symptoms is
compensable under § 402A. Davis, Product Liability Under Section 402A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts and the Model Uniform Product Liability Act, 16
Wake Forest L. Rev. 513, 531 n.99 (1980). Medical research has identified two
discrete responses to trauma, a primary and a secondary response. Leong v. Taka-
saki, 55 Hawaii 398, 411-12, 520 P.2d 758, 766-67 (1974); Independent Tort, supra
note 100, at 1248-50. The initial response, such as fear, grief or embarrassment, Is an
attempt by the individual to dissipate the stress precipitated by the event, id. at 1249
& nn.67-68, and is transient in nature. Smith & Solomon, Traumatic Neuroses in
Court, 30 Va. L. Rev. 87, 123 (1943). The secondary reaction is typically exemplified
by a traumatic neurosis, and is more debilitating. Smith & Solomon, supra, at 92-99;
Independent Tort, supra note 94, at 1249-51. The term "traumatic neurosis" de-
scribes a primarily psychic injury precipitated by either physical or emotional
trauma. Keiser, Traumatic Neurosis: A Common Problem, 2 Law. Med. J. 173, 173
(2d ed. 1974). Four kinds of traumatic neuroses appear frequently in personal injury
cases. They are (1) anxiety reactions, which are characterized by a state of nervous-
ness and tension, Blinder, Psychiatric Aspects of Traumatic Injuries, 1 Law. Med. J.
313, 315 (2d ed. 1973); Smith & Solomon, supra, at 94; (2) phobic reactions, Blinder,
supra, at 316; see Ferrara v. Galluchio, 5 N.Y.2d 16, 19-20, 152 N.E.2d 249, 251,
176 N.Y.S.2d 996, 998 (1958); Shanahan v. Orenstein, 52 A.D.2d 164, 168, 383
N.Y.S.2d 327, 330 (1976), appeal dismissed, 40 N.Y.2d 985, 359 N.E.2d 435, 390
N.Y.S.2d 927 (1977); (3) hysterical neurosis, which results in a bodily impairment
that has no physical basis, such as paralysis, Blinder, supra, at 316; Modlin, Psychia-
try and the Law, in Modern Legal Medicine, Psychiatry and Forensic Science 721,
724 (W. Curran, A. McGarry, C. Petty eds. 1980); Independent Tort, supra note 94,
at 1250-51; see Williamson v. Bennett, 251 N.C. 498, 501, 112 S.E.2d 48, 50 (1960);
and (4) depressive reactions. Blinder, supra, at 318-21; see D'Ambra v. United States,
396 F. Supp. 1180, 1182 (D.R.I. 1973); Mobaldi v. Board of Regents, 55 Cal. App.
3d 573, 578, 127 Cal. Rptr. 720, 723 (1976), overruled on other grounds, Baxter v.
Superior Court, 19 Cal. 3d 461, 466 n.4, 563 P.2d 871, 874 n.4, 138 Cal. Rptr. 315,
318 n,4 (1977). A traumatic neurosis, by preventing an individual from functioning
normally, can be a. debilitating as a physical injury. Laughlin, Neuroses Following
Trauma, in 6 Traumatic Medicine for the Attorney 122 (P. Cantor ed. 1962); Keiser,
supra, at 175; Independent Tort, supra note 94, at 1251-52.
102. See, e.g., Mobaldi v. Board of Regents, 55 Cal. App. 3d 573, 578, 127 Cal.
Rptr. 720, 723 (1976) (depression and weight loss), overruled on other grounds,
Baxter v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. 3d 461, 466 n.4, 563 P.2d 871, 874 n.4, 138 Cal.
Rptr. 315, 318 n.4 (1977); Daley v. LaCroix, 384 Mich. 4, 15-16, 179 N.W.2d 390,
396 (1970) (weight loss and nervousness); Toms v. McConnell, 45 Mich. App. 647,
657, 207 N.W.2d 140, 1,45 (1973) (depression); Corso v. Merrill, 119 N.H. 647, 658,
406 A.2d 300, 307 (1979) (same); Hughes v. Moore, 214 Va. 27, 29, 35, 197 S.E.2d
214, 216, 220 (1973) (anxiety reaction, phobia and hysteria); cf. Wolfe v. Sibley,
Lindsay & Curr Co., 36 N.Y.2d 505, 508, 510, 330 N.E.2d 603, 604, 608, 369
N.Y.S.2d 637, 639, 641 (1975) (acute depressive reaction and resultant weight loss
compensable psychological injury in workman's compensation case).
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The essential issue is the adequacy of proof of the injury.' 0 3 As one
court noted, "[t]he term 'physical' is not used in its ordinary sense for
purposes of applying the 'physical consequences' rule. Rather, the
word is used to indicate that the condition .. for which recovery is
sought must be one susceptible of objective determination." ,04 Emo-
tional distress is frequently manifested in demonstrable physical reac-
tions, such as vomiting, nausea, or injury to the nervous system.' 05 In
such cases, the harm is clearly capable of proof. 10 Furthermore,
courts and commentators have recognized that recovery for emotional
distress may be proper even in the absence of physical symptoms,
when the circumstances of the case provide a "guarantee of [the]
genuineness" of the injury.' 7
Moreover, strict adherence to a physical harm requirement in
three-party cases is unwarranted because such a requirement is not
rigorously imposed even in existing products liability law. Courts have
allowed recovery for an essentially emotional injury'0 8 in cases involv-
103. Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 929-30, 616 P.2d 813, 821,
167 Cal. Rptr. 831, 839 (1980); Rodrigues v. State, 52 Hawaii 156, 170-71, 472 P.2d
509, 519 (1970); Daley v. LaCroix, 384 Mich. 4, 13-15, 179 N.W.2d 390, 395-96
(1970); Ferrara v. Galluchio, 5 N.Y.2d 16, 21, 152 N.E.2d 249, 252, 176 N.Y.S.2d
996, 1000 (1958); Independent Tort, supra note 94, at 1258-62.
104. In re United States, 418 F.2d 264, 269 (1st Cir. 1969); accord Vance v.
Vance, 286 Md. 490, 500, 408 A.2d 728, 733-34 (1979).
105. In re United States, 418 F.2d 264, 269 (1st Cir. 1969); Strazza v. McKittrick,
146 Conn. 714, 717, 156 A.2d 149, 151 (1959); Ferrara v. Galluchio, 5 N.Y.2d 16,
21, 152 N.E.2d 249, 252, 176 N.Y.S.2d 996, 999 (1958); Savard v. Cody Chevrolet,
Inc., 126 Vt. 405, 406-07, 234 A.2d 656, 657 (1967). The most frequently occurring
reactions to trauma are catalogued in Blinder, supra note 101, at 315-18; Keiser,
supra note 101, at 175-77; Modlin, supra note 101, at 722-25; Independent Tort,
supra note 94, at 1250-51.
106. Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 930-31, 616 P.2d 813, 821,
167 Cal. Rptr. 831, 839 (1980); W. Prosser, supra note 1, at 328; Independent Tort,
supra note 94, at 1250.
107. Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Hawaii 398, 412-13, 520 P.2d 758, 766-67 (1974);
Johnson v. State, 37 N.Y.2d 378, 383-84, 334 N.E.2d 590, 593, 372 N.Y.S.2d 638,
643 (1975); Ferrara v. Galluchio, 5 N.Y.2d 16, 21, 152 N.E.2d 249, 252, 176
N.Y.S.2d 996, 999 (1958); W. Prosser, supra note 1, at 330.
108. Slonsky v. Phoenix Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 18 Ariz. App. 10, 11-12, 499
P.2d 741, 742-43 (1972); Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Langston, 198 Ark. 59, 62-63,
127 S.W.2d 263, 263-64 (1939); Medeiros v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 57 Cal. App.
2d 707, 709, 135 P.2d 676, 680 (1943); Way v. Tampa Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 260
So. 2d 288, 290 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972); Kroger Co. v. Beck, 375 N.E.2d 640,
645-46 (Ind. Ct. App. 1978); Connell v. Norton Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 187 Kan.
393, 395, 357 P.2d 804, 807-08 (1960); Deris v. Finest Foods, Inc., 198 So. 2d 412,
417 (La. Ct. App. 1967); Wallace v. Coca-Cola Bottling Plants, Inc., 269 A.2d 117,
121 (Me. 1970); Hattiesburg Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Cawley, 2 So. 2d 143, 143
(Miss. 1941); Kenney v. Wong Len, 81 N.H. 427, 432-34, 128 A. 343, 346-47 (1925);
Gay v. A & P Food Stores, 39 Misc. 2d 360, 364, 240 N.Y.S.2d 809, 813 (Civ. Ct.
1963).
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ing adulterated food and beverages, 109 provided that there was suffi-
cient proof of causation and of the genuineness of the injury. 110 In a
typical case, the plaintiff finds a harmful substance in a food product
and experiences emotional distress with resultant physical conse-
quences."' In one case, the plaintiff, while drinking a bottle of
109. The use of the phrase "adulterated food and beverage cases" in this Note
refers to those cases where either food or beverages contain a foreign substance. See
generally 3 R. Hursch & H. Bailey, American Law of Products Liability 125-532 (2d
ed. 1975). Recovery may be sought in negligence, where liability is predicated on the
manufacturer's breach of a duty to exercise a high degree of care in the preparation
of his product. See, e.g., Medeiros v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 57 Cal. App. 2d 707,
715, 135 P.2d 676, 680 (1943); Hertzler v. Manshum, 228 Mich. 416, 423, 200 N.W.
155, 157 (1924); Rozumailski v. Philadelphia Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 296 Pa. 114,
116, 145 A. 700, 700 (1929). Other courts have based the manufacturer's liability on
a breach of warranty. E.g., Connell v. Norton Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 187 Kan.
393, 394, 357 P.2d 804, 805 (1960); Le Blanc v. Louisiana Coca Cola Bottling Co.,
221 La. 919, 926, 60 So. 2d 873, 875 (1952); Jacob E. Decker & Sons v. Capps, 139
Tex. 609, 612, 164 S.W.2d 828, 829 (1942). As one court noted, "[ilt seems to be the
rule that where food products sold for human consumption are unfit for that pur-
pose, there is such an utter failure of the purpose for which the food is sold, and the
consequences of eating unsound food are so disastrous to human health and life, that
the law imposes a warranty of purity in favor of the ultimate consumer as a matter of
public policy." Id.; accord Cernes v. Pittsburg Coca Cola Bottling Co., 183 Kan.
758, 761, 332 P.2d 258, 261 (1958). Recovery may also be sought under strict liability
in tort. See, e.g., Slonsky v. Phoenix Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 18 Ariz. App. 10, 12,
499 P.2d 741, 743 (1972); Shoshone Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Dolinski, 82 Nev. 439,
443, 420 P.2d 855, 857-58 (1966).
110. Medeiros v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 57 Cal. App. 2d 707, 713-14, 135 P.2d
676, 678-80 (1943); Kroger Co. v. Beck, 375 N.E.2d 640, 645-46 (Ind. Ct. App.
1978); Connell v. Norton Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 187 Kan. 393, 396-97, 357 P.2d
804, 807-08 (1960); Deris v. Finest Foods, Inc., 198 So. 2d 412, 416-17 (La. Ct. App.
1967); Wallace v. Coca-Cola Bottling Plants, Inc., 269 A.2d 117, 121-22 (Me. 1970);
Gay v. A & P Food Stores, 39 Misc. 2d 360, 363-64, 240 N.Y.S.2d 809, 812-13 (Civ.
Ct. 1963).
111. E.g., Slonsky v. Phoenix Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 18 Ariz. App. 10, 11, 499
P.2d 741, 742 (1972) (metal filings in bottle resulted in vomiting and nausea);
Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Langston, 198 Ark. 59, 60, 127 S.W.2d 263, 263 (1939)
(swallowed ground glass in bottled beverage resulted in vomiting and nausea);
Medeiros v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 57 Cal. App. 2d 707, 709, 135 P.2d 676, 677
(1943) (bottle brush in coke bottle resulted in illness); Way v. Tampa Coca Cola
Bottling Co., 260 So. 2d 288, 288 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972) (rat in bottle resulted in
nausea and vomiting); Kroger Co. v. Beck, 375 N.E.2d 640, 642 (Ind. Ct. App. 1978)
(needle in piece of meat pricked throat, resulted in aversion to meats); Connell v.
Norton Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 187 Kan. 393, 394. 357 P.2d 804, 806 (1960)
(centipede in bottle resulted in vomiting and nausea); Deris v. Finest Foods, Inc.,
198 So. 2d 412, 416-17 (La. Ct. App. 1967) (glass particles in banana split resulted in
mental and emotional anxiety); Wallace v. Coca-Cola Bottling Plants, Inc., 269 A.2d
117, 118 (Me. 1970) (prophylactic in bottle resulted in vomiting); Hattiesburg Coca
Cola Bottling Co. v. Cawley, 2 So. 2d 143, 143 (Miss. 1941) (roach in coke bottle
resulted in vomiting and nausea); Kenney v. Wong Len, 81 N.H. 427, 430-32, 128 A.
343, 344-46 (1925) (mouse hidden in food served in restaurant resulted in nervous
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Coke, discovered something that "resembled a rat with the hair
sucked off."" 2 This unfortunate encounter resulted in vomiting and
nausea." 3  A number of courts regard these symptoms as sufficient
physical illness to permit recovery. 114 Other courts, mindful that the
trend is toward greater protection of the consumer, have permitted
recovery without strictly adhering to the physical injury require-
ment. "5 In these cases, the vomiting and nausea experienced by the
plaintiffs were regarded by the courts solely as objective manifesta-
tions of the emotional harm, indicative of the legitimacy of the com-
plaint." 6
In addition, in one products liability case,"17 a court upheld a jury
verdict awarding plaintiff $30,000 for the mental anguish and suffer-
ing she experienced when a defective hair conditioner caused her hair
to fall out." 8 In reversing a decision setting aside the jury verdict as
excessive, the court noted that "[ilt is obvious the [lower court] deter-
mined that in order to recover damages .. there should have been
physical pain and suffering. That is a false premise." "', The outra-
geousness of the situation guaranteed the genuineness of the injury.120
Reliance on such precedent permitting recovery for an emotional
injury in two-party products liability cases is entirely appropriate in
three-party cases. It would be clearly anomalous to permit recovery
for shock at viewing a worm in a can of corn,' 2 ' while the user of a
shock); Gay v. A & P Food Stores, 39 Misc. 2d 360, 361, 240 N.Y.S.2d 809, 810 (Civ.
Ct. 1963) (worm in can of corn resulted in nausea and stomach pains). More serious
consequences can result from the ingestion of a harmful food product. Obieli v.
Campbell Soup Co., 623 F.2d 668, 668-69 (10th Cir. 1980) (roach in soup caused
emotional distress which in turn caused "venous thrombosis, pulmonary emboli, and
esophageal hiatus hernia").
112. Way v. Tampa Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 So. 2d 288, 288 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1972).
113. Id.
114. See, e.g., Crystal Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Cathey, 83 Ariz. 163, 172-73,
317 P.2d 1094, 1100 (1957); Moss v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 103 Cal. App. 2d 380,
383-84, 229 P.2d 802, 805 (1951); Harris v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 35 Ill. App. 2d
406, 419, 183 N.E.2d 56, 62-63 (1962); Gay v. A & P Food Stores, 39 Misc. 2d 360,
363, 240 N.Y.S.2d 809, 812 (Civ. Ct. 1963).
115. Way v. Tampa Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 So. 2d 288, 290 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1972); Wallace v. Coca-Cola Bottling Plants, 269 A.2d 117, 121 (Me. 1970): ef.
Hunsley v. Giard, 87 Wash. 2d 424, 436, 553 P.2d 1096, 1103 (1976) (emotional
suffering compensable if manifested by objective symptoms).
116. Way v. Tampa Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 So. 2d 288, 290 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1972); Wallace v. Coca-Cola Bottling Plants, 269 A.2d 117, 120-21 (Me. 1970).
117. Wilson v. Redken Laboratories, 562 S.W.2d 632 (Ky. 1978).
118. Id. at 634.
119. Id. at 636.
120. Id. at 635-37.
121. Gay v. A & P Food Stores, 39 Misc. 2d 360, 361, 365, 240 N.Y.S.2d 809, 810,
814 (Civ. Ct. 1963).
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prescription drug, taken while pregnant, cannot recover for severe
emotional trauma caused by the birth of a physically deformed
child.12 2 If more certainty is needed in ascertaining the genuineness
of the emotional harm, a requirement similar to one of the Dillon
factors, 23 that the user have a close relationship with the other in-
jured party, 124 may be imposed.
CONCLUSION
When confronted with third-party emotional distress in products
liability, courts should not adopt the bystander analysis used in non-
product negligence. Inherent in products law is an identifiable and
limited class of plaintiffs- users. Indeed, the adulterated food and
beverage cases provide adequate precedent for recovery for a user's
emotional distress. When a person uses a defective product and that
defect causes physical injury to a loved one, the user is clearly more
than a mere onlooker. Permitting user recovery for genuine emotional
harms cannot be said to be either an uncontrolled or unwarranted
burden on manufacturers.
Linda Trummer-Napolitano
122. Mink v. University of Chicago, 460 F. Supp. 713, 719 (N.D. Ill. 1978);
Woodill v. Parke Davis & Co., 58 Ill. App. 3d 349, 354-55, 374 N.E.2d 683, 687-88
(1978), aff'd, 79 Ill. 2d 26, 402 N.E.2d 194 (1980); Vaccaro v. Squibb Corp., 52
N.Y.2d 809, 810, 418 N.E.2d 386, 386, 436 N.Y.S.2d 871, 871 (1980).
123. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
124. As one court observed, "[iut is the presence of deep, intimate, familial ties
between the plaintiff and the physically injured person that makes the harm to
emotional tranquility so serious and compelling." Portee v. Jaffee, 84 N.J. 88, 98, 417
A.2d 521, 526-27 (1980).
